Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition by Sullivan, David B.
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 15
Number 1 Fall 1991 Article 5
1-1-1991
Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry in
International Extradition
David B. Sullivan
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
David B. Sullivan, Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition, 15 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 111 (1991).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol15/iss1/5
Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiry
in International Extradition
By DAVID B. SULLIVAN*
Member of the Class of 1992
The United States regularly extradites individuals to foreign coun-
tries to face trials for crimes they allegedly committed in those coun-
tries.' United States courts do not inquire into the procedures or
treatment which await these surrendered fugitives in the requesting
countries. Instead, the courts apply a rule of non-inquiry, restricting
their focus to the issues of whether sufficient evidence exists to extradite
the relator2 and whether the terms of the extradition treaty have been
met.
3
The rule of non-inquiry bars the courts from denying extradition
even when it is clear that the relator will be the victim of torture or cruel
and inhumane treatment. Torture and inhumane treatment have always
been a widespread problem in many countries. Despite universal con-
demnation, credible claims of torture exist against more than one-third of
the world's governments. Torture is used to extract information, sup-
press ideas, or simply torment persons perceived as enemies.4
Claims by relators concerning their potential treatment in the re-
questing country fall within the exclusive purview of the executive
branch of the United States government. The executive branch has ex-
clusive discretion to decide whether to protect an individual from poten-
* B.A, University of San Francisco, 1989. The author dedicates this Note to George H.
Sullivan, who practiced law in San Francisco from 1923 to 1990.
1. David Lauter, There's No Place to Hide, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 26, 1984, at 1. In 1982, the
United States was involved in 350 extraditions, both as the sending and receiving state.
2. The relator is the person sought by the requesting state under the extradition treaty.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
4. Karl R. Moor & Alan H. Nichols, Combatting Torture in the '90's, 17 HUst. RTS. 28
(1990). In Iran's prisons, whippings, burnings, electric shock treatments and mock executions
persist. In South Korea, pro-democracy students and workers are beaten, water-tortured, and
threatened with death. In Turkey, methods of torture against political prisoners include beat-
ings of the soles of their feet, electric current applied to their genitals, and the extraction of
teeth, fingernails and toenails. Other countries which have reputedly tortured persons are
Libya, Burundi, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Ireland, and South Africa. The United States is a
party to bilateral extradition treaties with Turkey, Sri Lanka, Ireland, and South Africa.
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tial human rights abuses in a foreign country.' The Secretary of State
has discretionary power to refuse, grant, or conditionally grant extradi-
tion on technical, political, or humanitarian grounds.
This Note will argue that the rule of non-inquiry should be dis-
carded and replaced by a rule more sensitive to humanitarian concerns.
A court should allow inquiry when the alleged offender presents evidence
of treatment in the requesting state which is "antipathetic to a federal
court's sense of decency." 6 This standard would return to that which
was first suggested in 1960, in dicta by the Second Circuit in Gallina v.
Fraser,7 and was later recognized by many other courts. The (,allina
dicta was excised by the Second Circuit in Ahmad v. Wigen in 1990. 8
This Note proposes that the Gallina dicta be adopted as the standard of
inquiry.
The Note begins with a short description of the international extra-
dition process. Next, it sets forth the origins of the rule of non-inquiry
and the dicta of Gallina v. Fraser. The Note then analyzes the most com-
mon arguments supporting the rule of non-inquiry and proposes a lim-
ited exception to the rule. The limited exception is supported by
arguments, constitutional authority, and domestic and international
precedent.
I. THE EXTRADITION PROCESS
Extradition is the "legal process based on a treaty, reciprocity, com-
ity,9 or national law, whereby one state delivers to another, a person
charged or convicted of a criminal offense against the laws of the request-
ing state or in violation of international criminal law to be tried or pun-
ished in the requesting state."10 Absent a treaty obligation, however,
international law imposes no duty upon a country to extradite a person
who has sought asylum within its boundaries."
In the United States, international extradition is a national power
controlled by the federal government and denied to the states. 12 The
5. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 789 (9th Cir. 1986).
6. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960).
7. Id.
8. Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
9. "The principle of comity is that courts of one state or juri,:diction will give effect to
laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out
of deference and mutual respect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th Ed. 1990).
10. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 405-06 (1986).
11. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
12. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414 (1866).
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federal government controls extradition pursuant to federal statute1 3 and
treaties with foreign governments.14 A foreign state must have signed a
treaty with the United States in order to invoke the extradition process.' 5
The United States has bilateral extradition treaties with over 100 coun-
tries16 and is a party to a regional multilateral treaty with Latin Ameri-
can countries.'7 Many of these treaties date back to the early 1900s.18
The United States is also a signatory to a number of multilateral conven-
tions on various subjects of international criminal law which contain ex-
tradition provisions.' 9
The extradition process has traditionally involved all three branches
of government. The executive branch has the authority to grant extradi-
tion requests based on its power to conduct foreign affairs." However,
the Senate has the power to "advise and consent" in treaty ratification. 2'
Extradition is also a legal process which is subject to judicial review and
the constitutional protections relating to individual liberty.'
A. Judicial Involvement in the Extradition Process
Judicial involvement in the extradition process is initiated when the
requesting state submits a complaint charging the commission of a crime
by the relator within its jurisdiction. 23 At a hearing, a judge establishes
the identity of the relator2" and determines whether the charges are ex-
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1985), for a list of bilateral treaties of extradition into which the
United States has entered.
15. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
16. See IGOR I. KAVASS & ADOLF SPRUDZS, EXTRADITION LAwS AND TREATIES:
UNITED STATES (1979 & Supp. 1989).
17. The U.S. is a member of the Montevideo Convention, signed at Montevideo, Dec. 26,
1933, 49 Stat. 3111, T.S. No. 882, with seventeen Latin American states.
18. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181. Some of the countries with which the United States has entered
into bilateral extradition treaties include: Bolivia, Apr. 21, 1900, 32 Stat. 1857 (entered into
force Jan. 22, 1902); Cuba, Jan. 14, 1926, 44 Stat. 2392 (entered into force June 18, 1926);
Egypt, Aug. 11, 1874, 19 Stat. 572 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1875); Iraq, June 7, 1934, 49
Stat. 3380 (entered into force Apr. 23, 1936); India, Dec. 22, 1931, 47 Stat. 2122 (entered into
force Mar. 9, 1942); Nicaragua, Mar. 1, 1905, 35 Stat. 1869 (entered into force July 14, 1907);
and South Africa, Dec. 18, 1947, 2 U.S.T. 884 (entered into force Apr. 30, 1951).
19. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: A DIGESTIANDEX
OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1815-1985 (1985).
20. BAssiouNI, supra note 10, at 407. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
21. BAssloum, supra note 10, at 407.
22. Id
23. Id at 418.
24. Ex parte La Mantia, 206 F. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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traditable under the treaty.25 The judge then decides whether the evi-
dence presented in support of the request constitutes "probable cause"
for extradition.26 The extradition hearing is not a full hearing on the
merits of the case,27 and the actual guilt or innocence of the relator is not
at issue in the hearing.28 The issue is limited to whether evidence exists
to justify the extradition of the relator to the foreign jurisdiction where
he or she will stand trial for the crimes charged.29 If the judge finds that
sufficient evidence exists, the request will be certified and passed to the
executive branch.30
The federal judiciary must determine that the relator has been
availed of all United States constitutional guarantees before the request
will be certified. 31 This requirement has long been perceived as essential.
In 1852 United States Supreme Court Justice Catron wrote that "extradi-
tion without an unbiased hearing before an independent judiciary... [is]
highly dangerous to liberty, and ought never to be allowed in this coun-
try."' 32 The federal extradition statute agrees with this proposition by
providing for judicial determination of the propriety of the issuance of a
certificate of extradition.33 This statute gives judges, as members of the
least political branch, an important role in the extradition process.34 The
court determines whether the relator is subject to extradition and, if so,
must certify the supporting record to the Secretary of State.35 However,
as Judge Friendly of the District of Columbia Circuit observed in In re
Mackin, the certification itself is "non-judicial because the Secretary of
State is not bound to extradite even if the certificate is granted.
'36
Once a request for extradition has been certified, the Secretary of
State determines whether or not extradition will be granted.37 The actual
surrender of the relator to a foreign state is within the President's consti-
25. Collins v. Loise, 259 U.S. 309, 311-12 (1922). Under extradition treaties, the request-
ing state usually may seek extradition only if the offense is deemed a crime by both the request-
ing and requested state.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
27. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
28. Id.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
30. Id ; see also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 304 (1933).
31. BASSIOUNI, supra note 10, at 407.
32. Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)(quoting In re Kaine, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 103, 113 (1852)). In re Kaine was a 5-4 decision, J. Catron writing for the majority.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
34. Gill, 747 F. Supp. at 1038.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
36. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 136 n.19 (2d Cir. 1981).
37. BAssiouNi, supra note 10, at 424.
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tutional power to conduct foreign affairs.3" The President, as a matter of
practice, has delegated this power to the Secretary of State.39 The Secre-
tary of State may exercise discretion to either deny, grant, or condition-
ally grant extradition4° for any reason including technical, political, or
humanitarian concerns.4 As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
in Escobedo v. United States, "the ultimate decision to extradite is a mat-
ter within the exclusive prerogative of the Executive in the exercise of its
power to conduct foreign affairs."'42
B. Judicial Review of Extradition Hearing
If the court certifies extradition, the relator has no statutory right to
a direct appeal of the court's decision.43 However, the relator may seek
collateral relief by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus" or by seeking
a declaratory relief judgment to challenge the extradition order.' A de-
nial of habeas corpus may be appealed all the way to the United States
Supreme Court.'
The scope of habeas corpus review by the courts generally has been
restricted to questions relating to the identity of the relator, the existence
of a treaty, the extraditability of the crime charged,4 7 the requirement of
"double criminality,"4 the existence of probable cause, and the absence
of any grounds for denial of extradition.49 Most courts have followed the
Second Circuit's statement that "[r]eview by habeas corpus... tests only
the legality of the extradition proceedings; the question of the wisdom of
extradition remains for the executive branch to decide."1so However, in
1984 the Seventh Circuit in In re Burt, stated that: "[Flederal courts
38. I d; see Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L REv. 1313 (1962);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
39. BAssiouN, supra note 10, at 424.
40. Id; see Bain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
41. See generally Note, supra note 38.
42. Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036
(1980).
43. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369 (1919); In Re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 136 (2d Cir.
1981).
44. BAssiouNI, supra note 10, at 421; Miller, 252 U.S. at 364.
45. See Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1965).
46. BAssiouNI, supra note 10, at 421.
47. See Collins v. Loise, 259 U.S. 309, 311-12 (1922).
48. Double criminality requires that the offense charged must also constitute a crime
under the criminal laws of the requested and requesting state. BASSIOUNI, supra note 10, at
412.
49. Id at 421.
50. Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Wacker v. Bisson, 348
F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1965)).
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undertaking habeas corpus review of extraditions have the authority to
consider not only procedural defects in the extradition procedures that
are of constitutional dimension, but also the substantive conduct of the
United States in undertaking its decision to extradite if such conduct vio-
lates constitutional rights."51 The court thus asserted that federal courts
could review substantive as well as procedural claims.
H. THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY
The rule of non-inquiry has been invoked most often when the rela-
tor has raised concerns that he or she is likely to encounter treatment in
the requesting state that is significantly offensive to the United States
minimum standards of justice and basic human rights.52
The focus of extradition hearings is restricted to whether sufficient
evidence exists to extradite the relator and whether the terms of the ap-
plicable treaty have been met.53 Under the rule of non-inquiry, the court
is barred from denying extradition even when it is clear that the relator
will be the victim of torture or cruel and inhumane treatment.
Courts will not consider the criminal procedures in the requesting
state, instead referring these concerns to the Secretary of State.54 In Gar-
cia-Guillern v. United States, the Fifth Circuit observed that it was not
"permitted to inquire into the procedure which awaits the appellant upon
his return" to Peru.55 Similarly, in Peroff v. Hylton, the Fourth Circuit
refused to consider the accused's claim that he would be an assassination
target in a Swedish prison.56 In Peroff, the court held that "[a] denial of
extradition by the Executive may be appropriate when strong humanita-
rian grounds are present, but such grounds exist only when it appears
that, if extradited, the individual will be persecuted, not prosecuted, or
subjected to grave injustice."57
Courts also refuse to consider the threat of persecution, extreme
forms of punishment, or other humanitarian concerns as a bar to extradi-
tion. A glaring example of non-inquiry into the threat of persecution is
51. In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1484 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Plaster v. United States, 720
F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 1983).
52. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE
373 (1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION].
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
54. INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 52, at 372.
55. Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 989 (1972).





the case of In re Normano58 There, the District Court of Massachusetts
refused to take judicial cognizance of the potential abuse that Normano,
a Jew, might suffer at the hands of Nazi Germany during the 1930s.19
Similarly, in the case of Escobedo v. United States, Mexico sought the
accused's extradition on charges of attempted kidnapping of the Cuban
consul and a related murder.' The Fifth Circuit refused to entertain the
accused's objections to the Mexican criminal proceedings despite the fact
that his confession to Mexican authorities may have been obtained by
"means of torture., 6 1
Finally, United States courts do not examine a foreign government's
motives for seeking extradition or the fairness of a foreign judicial sys-
tem.62 In re Sindona is an example of the rule's application.63 In that
case, Sindona argued that his extradition should be denied because he
would not receive a fair trial in Italy. He submitted affidavits swearing
that he would likely be assassinated if extradited to Italy and that he
58. In re Normano, 7 F. Supp. 329 (D. Mass. 1934).
59. Id. at 330-31.
60. Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1036
(1980).
61. Id at 1102 n.3.
62. See, eg., Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1910) ("We are bound by the
existence of an extradition treaty to assume that the trial will be fair."); Quinn v. Robinson,
783 F.2d 776, 789 (9th Cir. 1986) ('mhe Secretary of State has sole discretion to determine
whether a request for extradition should be denied because it is a subterfuge."), cerL denied,
107 S.Ct. 271 (1986); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[Tihis
court will not inquire into the procedures which will apply after [the accused] is surrendered to
Israel"); Arnbjomstdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983) ("An
extraditing court will generally not inquire into the procedures or treatment which await a
surrendered fugitive in the requesting country."); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 518 (7th Cir.),
(The court, in declining to take judicial notice that Israel tortures prisoners stated, "[t]his
court has no jurisdiction to determine the requesting country's motives under this Treaty.")
cert denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[Ihe
degree of risk to Sindona's life from extradition is an issue that properly falls within the exclu-
sive purview of the executive branch."); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85, (2d Cir.)
("It is not the business of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity
of the judicial system of another sovereign nation."); cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976) Garcia-
Guillem v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), ("Neither are we permitted to
inquire into the procedure which awaits the appellant upon his return.... Such matters... are
left to the State Department... .") cert denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972); Gallina v. Fraser, 278
F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960) ("[Tihe conditions under which a fugitive is to be surrendered to a
foreign country are to be determined solely by the non-judicial branches of the Government.");
In Re Locatelli, 468 F. Supp. 568, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("I am simply without jurisdiction to
look behind the charges ... and must... yield this inquiry to the Secretary of State."); Ramos
v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459, 463 (S.D. Fla. 1959) ('The motive of the Cuban government in
demanding the extradition of the Defendants is not controlling."); In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 74
(E.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd per curiam, 241 U.S. 651 (1916).
63. In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
could not obtain a fair trial. He also offered press excerpts which indi-
cated he would not be provided with a fair trial. The District Court for
the Southern District of New York observed that only the Secretary of
State could deny extradition for those reasons:
The general rule is that an argument of this kind is not properly ad-
dressed to the court in the extradition hearing, but must be made to
the Department of State, which has the primary responsibility for de-
termining whether the treaties with foreign countries are being prop-
erly respected and carried out. The Department of State has the
discretion to deny extradition on humanitarian grounds, if it should
appear that it would be unsafe to surrender Sindona to the Italian
authorities."4
A. Origins of the Rule of Non-Inquiry
The rule of non-inquiry was set forth in 1901 in Neely v. Henke.65
In that case, Neely was an American citizen who was being extradited to
Cuba on charges of embezzling from the Cuban postal department. He
appealed the extradition decision, claiming that he would not receive the
same due process guarantees found in the United States Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court held that constitutional due process
guarantees are inapplicable to trials in foreign states for crimes commit-
ted outside the United States:
66
[These] provisions have no relation to the crimes committed without
the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign coun-
try. In connection with the above proposition, we are reminded of the
fact that the appellant is a citizen of the United States. But such citi-
zenship does not ... entitle him to demand, of right, a trial in any
other mode than that allowed to its own people by the country whose
laws he has violated and from whose justice he has fled.67
The constitutional protection against "cruel and unusual" treatment is
thus inapplicable to extradition proceedings.68 In 1972, in Holmes v.
Laird, the District of Columbia Circuit cited Neely with approval. The
court wrote that "surrender of an American citizen required by treaty for
the purposes of a foreign criminal proceeding is unimpaired by an ab-
sence in the foreign judicial system of safeguards in all respects
64. Id. at 694.
65. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 122-23.
68. BASSIOUNI, supra note 10, at 417.
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equivalent to those constitutionally enjoined upon American trials. '69
The rationale for the rule of non-inquiry is that it is not the courts'
business to assume responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judi-
cial system of another sovereign nation. Such a role would directly con-
flict with the principle of comity upon which extradition is based.70 In
1987, in In re Extradition of Singh, the New Jersey District Court found
that conducting an evidentiary hearing on the practices of the govern-
ment of India and the fate of the relators would "plainly 'establish an
American position on the honesty and integrity of a requesting foreign
government.' "71 Moreover, any judicial determination of the requesting
countries' criminal system might embarrass the United States and harm
its foreign relations.72
B. The Dicta of Gallina v. Fraser
In Gallina v. Fraser, decided in 1960, the Second Circuit court pro-
posed an exception to the rule of non-inquiry.73 In Gallina, Vincenzo
Gallina was denied habeas corpus relief despite the fact that he would be
imprisoned in Italy without an opportunity to defend himself. 4  The
Second Circuit followed the rule of non-inquiry. However, the court in
dicta noted that "we can imagine situations where the relator, upon ex-
tradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic
to a federal court's sense of decency as to require re-examination of the
[rule of non-inquiry]. '75 Thus, in some situations a court could inquire
into the potential treatment a relator would receive in the requesting
country and deny extradition where the relator would be subjected to
inhumane treatment or punishment.
Although no court has expressly used the Gallina dicta as a basis for
denying extradition, one district court did use the language from Gallina
to grant a temporary restraining order which prevented extradition. In
Starks v. Seaman,76 Jan Starks was an American serviceman charged,
tried, and convicted by a Chinese court for a drug offense. Starks was to
be transferred to Chinese authorities under an executive agreement.
77
69. Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).
70. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 485 (2d Cir. 1976).
71. In re Extradition of Singh, 123 F.RLD. 127, 136 (D.NJ. 1987) (quoting, Eain v.
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 516 (7th Cir. 1981)).
72. Id
73. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960).
74. Id at 78.
75. Id
76. Starks v. Seamans, 334 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Wisc. 1971).
77. Id
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The Eastern District Court of Wisconsin, for the purposes of a tempo-
rary restraining order, found that Stark's trial was a mockery of justice
and that the executive agreement had therefore been breached.7 8  The
court granted the temporary restraining order. Although the court based
its decision on the breach of the executive agreement, the court quoted
Gallina stating, "failure to grant a temporary restraining order in this
matter would result in a 'punishment... antipathetic to a federal court's
sense of decency.' ,,7 Although the temporary restraining order was
issued, Stark's motion for dismissal was denied.8"
The Gallina dicta recognizes a humanitarian concern for the relator
and provides the judiciary with a limited exception to the rule of non-
inquiry. While courts have repeatedly held that such inquiry is the ex-
clusive province of the Secretary of State, 1 they have at the same time
repeated the Gallina dicta. 2
11. SUPPORT FOR THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY
Many commentators and courts strongly support the rule of non-
inquiry. Steven Lubet, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, ar-
gued for the validity of the rule of non-inquiry in testimony before the
House Committee on the Judiciary.83 He stated that inquiries forbidden
by the rule are inextricably tied to the formulation and conduct of for-
eign policy.84 Any erosion of the rule by the judiciary would be an en-
croachment upon the executive's prerogative in foreign affairs.8 5 He also
reminded the committee that a foreign nation may only request extradi-
tion pursuant to a valid treaty which has been negotiated and executed
by the President and ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Senate.86 In
other words, "a political decision already will have been made concern-
78. Id. at 1256.
79. Id. at 1257 (quoting Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d at 79).
80. Id. at 1255.
81. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 789 (9th Cir. 1986).
82. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985); Prushinowski v. Sam-
pIes, 734 F.2d 1016, 1019 (4th Cir. 1984); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980);
Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir., 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977);
United States ex. rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1001; Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1105 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 449 U.S.
1036 (1980); Ambjornstdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983).
83. Reform of the Extradition Laws of the United States: Hearings on H.R. 2643 Before
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 93-97 (1983)
(testimony of Steven Lubet, Prof. of Law).
84. IaM at 95.




ing the general appropriateness of extradition to the foreign state."87
Thus, the existence of a valid extradition treaty establishes the accepta-
bility of trial procedures in the requesting state.,
Two major reasons are put forth supporting the view that extradi-
tion decisions are an appropriate subject only for discretionary executive
review: (1) the executive branch has foreign policy experience, and (2)
the executive branch has flexibility in conditioning extradition. Further-
more, the Second Circuit has explicitly rejected Gallina-style inquiry,
stating that it is improper for courts to inquire into the conditions a rela-
tor may face upon extradition. 9
A. Experience of Secretary of State in Foreign Policy
Courts consistently hold that potential abusive treatment in a re-
questing country is an appropriate subject only for discretionary execu-
tive review.' Courts take the position that the executive branch of
government is responsible for the conduct of United States foreign pol-
icy.91 Thus, the judiciary is reluctant to question the good faith actions
of a country with whom the United States has entered into an extradition
treaty.
92
The Secretary of State is arguably in a superior position to the
courts in considering the foreign relations consequences of denying extra-
dition.93 The Secretary of State has experience in dealing with foreign
countries and has access to both intelligence sources and diplomats. In
addition, the Secretary of State has diplomatic tools not available to the
judiciary, which can be used to ensure that the requesting state provides
a fair trial.94 In Eain v. Wilkes,95 the Seventh Circuit accepted the rea-
soning that the Secretary of State is superior:
Evaluations of the motivation behind a request for extradition so
clearly implicate the conduct of this country's foreign relations as to be
a matter better left to the Executive's discretion .... Thus, the Judici-
87. Id.
88. Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1910).
89. Ahmad v. Wiger, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990). See infra notes 102-119 and accom-
panying text.
90. Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d at 1249; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330
(1937).
91. See supra note 62.
92. Glucksman, 221 U.S. at 512.
93. Michael D. Scharf, Note, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid
Applying the Inquiry Provision of the Supplementary U.S-U.K Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 257, 269 (1988).
94. Id.
95. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
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ary's deference to the Executive on the 'subterfuge' question is appro-
priate since political questions would permeate any judgment on the
motivation of a foreign government.96
The good faith of the requesting state and possibility that the criminal
charge is a cloak for political action against the relator is not within the
scope of the court's proceedings.97 Moreover, the Secretary of State can
furnish the requested individual with adequate safeguards to ensure that
the requesting country intends to live up to its treaty obligations.9"
B. Flexibility of the Secretary of State in Extradition
Determination of extradition by the Secretary of State offers more
flexibility than by the judiciary.99 The Secretary of State has the power
to conditionally grant extradition subject to a variety of requirements.
Furthermore, the Secretary of State, through its diplomatic channels, has
the power to ensure that these requirements are met. For example, in
Eain v. WilkesY" the Secretary of State allowed an extradition only after
Israel agreed to a number of conditions. Israel pledged that the accused
would receive a public trial in a civilian court, that normal rules of crimi-
nal procedure would apply, and that the relator would have counsel of
choice. Israel also agreed the prosecution would have to prove guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, that the relator would have a right of appeal if
convicted, and that the death penalty would not be imposed.10 1
Courts, on the other hand, have no power to attach conditions to
extradition because they can only grant or deny certification of extradi-
tion. If courts deny certification, they must divest themselves of jurisdic-
tion over the relators and let them go free. In In re Extradition of Singh,
the relators claimed that they would be denied a fair trial and faced tor-
ture or murder upon their return to India.1"2 They were prepared to
present affidavits, press reports, and reports from Amnesty International
to support their claim. The court, in applying the rule of non-inquiry,
observed that the Secretary of State has much greater flexibility in extra-
dition than the judiciary. The court stated that:
Were the court to conclude that defendants face 'torture and/or mur-
96. Id. at 518.
97. In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915) aff'd per curium, 241 U.S. 65 (1916). See
also supra note 62.
98. In re Lincoln, 228 F. at 74.
99. In re Extradition of Singh, 123 F.R.D. 127, 137 (D.N.J.1987).
100. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
101. Singh, 123 F.R.D. at 137.
102. Id. at 127.
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der upon their return to India,' the only alternative presumably open
to the Court would be to divest itself of jurisdiction over them. How-
ever, were the Secretary to make such a determination, he could never-
theless permit extradition, albeit subject to conditions.
10 3
C. Rejection of Gallina Dicta
In Ahmad v. Wigen, the Second Circuit chastised the district court
for inquiring into the potential treatment that Ahmad might receive in
Israel after making a Gallina-style inquiry at a habeas corpus hearing."04
The relator in Ahmad petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas
corpus to prevent his extradition to Israel. 0 5 He had been charged with
firebombing and firing automatic weapons on a passenger bus in territory
occupied by Israel. Ahmad contended that if he were extradited to
Israel, torture would be used to force a confession. He claimed that he
would not receive even a semblance of due process and that he would be
housed in indecent detention and prison facilities." 6
The Eastern District Court of New York found that it was "empow-
ered to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the nature of treatment
probably awaiting petitioner in a requesting nation."107 The court's
opinion concluded that a due process exception to the rule of non-inquiry
was justified, and the court thus made an extensive inquiry into the evi-
dence supporting Ahmad's claim. 108 After this inquiry, the district court
found that the relator "failed to meet his burden of proving that, if extra-
dited, he would be subject to procedures or treatment so offensive to our
nation's sense of decency as to obligate the court to block his extradi-
tion."' °9 This was the first court to make such an extensive investigation
into a requesting country's procedures. The district court cited the Gal-
lina dicta in justifying its extensive inquiry.
0
Ahmad appealed the denial of the writ of habeas corpus to the Sec-
ond Circuit.' The Second Circuit "question[ed] the district court's de-
cision to explore the merits" of the petitioner's contention."12 The
Second Circuit cited Gallina solely for the proposition that "considera-
103. Id at 137.
104. Abmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
105. Ahmed v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y.1989).
106. Id at 409.
107. kd at 410.
108. Id at 410-20.
109. Id at 420.
110. Id at 413.
111. Wigen, 910 F.2d at 1063.
112. Id at 1066.
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tion of the procedures that will or may occur in the requesting country is
not within the purview of a habeas corpus judge."' 13 The court then
went on to say that it was "improper" for the district court to "take
testimony from both expert and fact witnesses and receive extensive re-
ports, affidavits, and other documentation concerning Israel's law en-
forcement procedures and its treatment of prisoners." '114
The Second Circuit's holding has had the effect of excising the dicta
in Gallina v. Fraser from habeas corpus hearings. Thus, Ahmad v. Wigen
holds that habeas courts have no cause to consider the conditions to
which a relator may be subjected in the requesting country." 5 However,
the ruling does not hold that such considerations are beyond the lawful
purview of the extradition judge or magistrate at the certification hearing
itself. 16
Subsequent decisions have reaffirmed the proposition that Ahmad v.
Wigen has foreclosed a Gallina style inquiry in habeas corpus proceed-
ings. In Gill v. Imundi,"7 the relators petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus in the Southern District Court of New York. They offered exten-
sive evidence that they would be subjected to treatment antipathetic to a
federal court's sense of decency." 8 The district court observed that "this
substantial, chilling proffer from sources with at least surface credibility
had convinced this court of the justification for further judicial inquiry
lest 'we... blind ourselves to the foreseeable and probable results of the
exercise of our jurisdiction.' "1" However, the court, citing Ahmad v.
Wigen, held that although the Gallina claim was facially compelling, it
could not be heard by the court and did not provide any basis for the
grant of a writ of habeas corpus.' 20 In sum, a judicial inquiry is now
foreclosed to a habeas proceeding since Gallina's dicta was rejected by
the Second Circuit in Ahmad v. Wigen.1 2 1
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A LIMITED EXCEPTION
TO THE RULE
Judicial review of extradition requests should include an inquiry
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1067.
115. Id. at 1066.
116. Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
117. 747 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1048 (citing Ahmed v. Wigen, 726 F.Supp. 389, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)).
120. Id. at 1050.
121. Id. at 1049.
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into the circumstances that the relator will face in the requesting country
following extradition. When the alleged offender provides evidence of
potential mistreatment in the requesting state which is antipathetic to a
federal court's sense of decency, the extradition request should be denied.
This standard is the same as that which was proposed in dicta in Gallina
v. Fraser. There are several reasons why a limited exception to the rule
of non-inquiry should exist: (1) the court is better equipped to protect
the relator than the Secretary of State; (2) the existence of extradition
treaties do not guarantee fair criminal procedures and punishment in the
requesting country; (3) constitutional authority exists for denying extra-
dition on humanitarian grounds; (4) the courts frequently decide the
very same issues which a Gallina style inquiry would involve; (5) the
United States-United Kingdom extradition treaty exemplifies an arrange-
ment which allows judicial review of extradition requests and determina-
tion of the fairness of the requesting country's judicial system; and (6)
there is international precedent for refusing extradition because of poten-
tial mistreatment of the relator in the requesting country.
A. Inability of Executive Branch to Protect Relator
The most compelling reason for allowing the court to inquire into
potential mistreatment of the relator is that present extradition proce-
dures offer little protection to the relator. Currently, the relator's only
protection against unjust treatment is an appeal to the Secretary of State.
The court is better equipped to protect the relator than the Secretary of
State. A judge is in a better position to evaluate evidence concerning
potential treatment of the relator in order to decide the issue fairly be-
cause courts have experience and procedures for evaluating such
evidence. 22
Moreover, an executive decision to block extradition might place the
United States in a position of embarrassment vis-a-vis a foreign govern-
ment and could burden United States foreign relations. Alternatively, in
order to avoid such embarrassment, the Secretary of State might ignore
the relator's claim and force the individual to suffer at the hands of the
requesting state. The political implications of denying an extradition re-
quest might easily overshadow the humanitarian concerns for the indi-
vidual in question.
Limited court review would benefit the executive by providing the
122. The Federal Rules of Evidence were designed specifically to aid the courts in evaluat-
ing evidence.
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Secretary of State with a judicial shield in controversial cases. 12 3 Any
embarrassment to United States foreign policy is likely to be more atten-
uated if it is a court that questions the other country's good faith or
procedures rather than the Secretary of State.124 Thus, limited judicial
review may be more effective in preventing international conflict than a
strict rule of non-inquiry.
Moreover, appeal to the executive branch has proven fruitless for
most relators. The Secretary of State consistently refuses to consider al-
legations that the accused might not receive a fair trial in the courts of
the requesting nation.'25 The usual basis for this refusal is that one na-
tion should not impugn the integrity of the tribunals of another nation. 126
From 1941 to 1962, only two extradition requests have been denied by
the executive branch. 127 Each request was refused under an express pro-
vision of the extradition treaty. K. Eugene Malmborg, an Assistant
Legal Adviser for the State Department, stated that during his fourteen
years of experience he had no knowledge of any instance when the Exec-
utive branch had barred extradition, other than for relators who fell
within the political offense exception.
128
B. Extradition Treaties Do Not Guarantee Fair Treatment
The United States has signed extradition treaties with some coun-
tries whose notions of due process and fair punishment are questiona-
ble,129 including Yugoslavia, Albania, South Africa, Rumania, Bulgaria,
Ghana, Iraq, Paraguay, Poland, Zambia, and Haiti. 3 ' Many of these
countries have changed governments since the United States signed the
treaties.1
3 '
123. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the US.: 1981-1983, 17 AK-
RON L. REV. 495, 564-65 (1984).
124. John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEo. L.J. 1441,
1481-82 (1988). See also Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hearing.; on H.R. 5227 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1982)
(testimony of M. Cherif Bassiouni, Prof. of Law).
125. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION § 376 (1891),
126. Id.
127. Note, supra note 38, at 1328.
128. Barbara Ann Banoff & Christopher H. Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offenders": The
Political Offense Exception to Extradition in United States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L, & POL.
169, 172 (1984).
The political offense exception allows the United States court3 to inquire into potential
mistreatment of relators who are charged with political offenses. Swe infra notes 151-54, and
accompanying text.
129. Kester, supra, note 124, at 1480.




The existence of these new governments refutes the argument that
Congress ratified the treaties based on its determination that the request-
ing countries' criminal procedures could provide a fair trial to the de-
fendant. Therefore, Professor Steven Lubet's argument before the House
Committee on the Judiciary that an extradition treaty represents Con-
gress' political decision concerning the appropriateness of extradition is
not always valid. 3 2 Because some of these countries cannot guarantee
what a United States court might consider a fair trial, the relator needs
the extra protection suggested by the Gallina dicta.
C. Constitutional Authority
Several cases suggest that it may be unconstitutional for the United
States to allow extradition where the relator may be subjected to inhu-
mane procedures or punishment. Constitutional authority exists which
would enable the judiciary to deny extradition on humanitarian grounds.
Courts are not prevented by treaty or statute from inquiring into the
potential treatment a relator might receive.
133
The Second Circuit has stated that the due process clause in the
Constitution may bar extradition under some circumstances. In Rosado
v. Civiletti, the defendants demonstrated that their convictions in Mexico
"manifested a shocking insensitivity to their dignity as human beings and
were obtained under a criminal process devoid of even a scintilla of rudi-
mentary fairness and decency."' 34 The defendants had been arrested,
convicted, and sentenced to prison in Mexico for narcotics offenses.
They were transfered to United States custody pursuant to a treaty under
which each had voluntarily agreed to forego his right to challenge the
validity of his Mexican conviction. The Second Circuit reversed the
Connecticut District Court's grant of habeas corpus review and held that
the defendants were estopped from arguing due process violations be-
cause of their voluntary waiver of the right to challenge their convictions.
However, the Second Circuit stated that where evidence indicated offi-
cially sanctioned torture and abusive criminal proceedings, the presump-
tion of fairness accorded to a requesting nation might be abandoned.' 3 5
The court also noted that constitutional due process guarantees mighIt
pose a barrier to extradition." 6 The Second Circuit acknowledged the
132. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
133. Tracey Hughes, Note, Extradition Reforn: The Role of the Judiciary in Protecting the
Rights of a Requested Individual, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 293, 303 (1986).
134. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1182 (2d Cir. 1980).
135. Id at 1195.
136. Id at 1195-96.
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rule of non-inquiry as set forth in Neely v. Henkel, yet noted that the
Constitution governs the manner in which United States officials may
join in the efforts of the prosecuting country.
137
The Fourth Circuit in Plaster v. United States also discussed the
constitutional limitations on the conduct of the United States govern-
ment in the extradition process. 138 In Plaster, United States law enforce-
ment officials promised a United States serviceman immunity from
criminal proceedings in exchange for his testimony in another case.
Later, West Germany wanted to extradite him on murder charges. The
court held that the breach of the immunity agreement constituted an im-
permissible violation of due process rights. 139 The court, while acknowl-
edging the wide scope of executive discretion in making the final
extradition decision, reserved the power to review the constitutionality of
the executive's action.'" Regardless of obligations under the extradition
treaty, the court held that the United States may not extradite an individ-
ual where such extradition would violate the individual's constitutional
rights.141 The Fourth Circuit stated that "the judiciary has jurisdiction
to ensure that the executive's power to extradite is not being exercised so
as to violate individual constitutional rights." '142
In In re Burt, the Seventh Circuit held that constitutional restraints
are applicable to the government's extradition decisions. 43 This case in-
volved a second defendant in the same incident as in Plaster. The court
held that extradition decisions may not violate the basic notions of "fair
play and decency" implicit in the due process clause of the 5th Amend-
ment. 144 The court also stated that such decisions must conform to
"such other exceptional constitutional limitations as may exist because of
particularly atrocious procedures or punishment employed by the foreign
jurisdiction."1 45 Therefore, In re Burt appears to mandate constitutional
restraints upon extradition where the relator may be subject to "atro-
cious procedures or punishment" after extradition.
46
137. Id.
138. Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1983).
139. Id. at 351.
140. Id. at 347-49.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 348.
143. In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1482 (7th Cir. 1984).
144. Id. at 1486-87.
145. Id. at 1487.




Although some foreign policy considerations necessarily arise in ex-
tradition cases, they should not necessarily preclude judicial inquiry.
The Secretary of State contends that courts cannot or should not deter-
mine issues concerning the potential treatment of a relator and the nature
of a foreign state's criminal justice procedures. In fact, courts frequently
decide the same issues which the Gallina dicta suggests the judiciary
undertake.147
Decisions with foreign policy implications are made when courts re-
view the political asylum cases of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. In order to decide whether to grant political asylum to persons
fearing persecution, courts take into account the treatment they might
receive if returned to their home countries.148 The courts also review
these considerations in hearing requests for political asylum and in cases
brought under the Alien Tort Claims Statute.
1 49
Moreover, under the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
courts may inquire into evidence of potential persecution awaiting refu-
gees returned to their home countries. 5" Refugee status must be granted
prior to the inquiry into potential persecution. 151 The Protocol defines a
refugee as an individual who is unable or unwilling to return to the coun-
try of nationality or habitual residence due to a "well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion.... ."52
Finally, the political offense exception to extradition allows United
States courts to inquire into the potential for mistreatment in a foreign
country. Under the political offense exception, 153 United States courts
147. The court noted this fallacy in the government's position in Quinn v. Robinson, 783
F.2d 776, 790 n.8 (9th Cir. 1986).
148. Kester, supra note 124, at 1481.
149. Hughes, supra note 133, at 316.
150. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter Protocol]; see Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1971).
151. Protocol, supra note 150.
152. Id. art. 1(2). However, refugee status is not available to most individuals sought for
extradition. Under the Protocol, those individuals believed to have committed a serious non-
political crime outside the country of refuge and prior to admission as a refugee are excepted
from refugee status. This exception in effect prohibits most persons who are to be extradited
from qualifying for refugee status. Ia
153. The U.S. judiciary first applied the political offense exception, under which a re-
quested state refuses to extradite a fugitive who has committed an offense of a "political"
character, in the case of In Re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (holding that the judiciary
was authorized to determine that murders taking place during a revolutionary uprising were
nonextraditable political offenses).
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are able to protect relators charged with political crimes from potential
mistreatment by a requesting state. 154 The exception is only available to
those individuals who can prove that their alleged crimes constitute a
political offense."' 5 Because cases involving political crimes are particu-
larly vulnerable to fair trial problems in the requesting state, the political
offense exception has enabled United States courts to deny extradition in
this entire class of cases.
156
In sum, there are many situations in which United States courts in-
quire into a foreign country's criminal justice procedures. The policy
rationale for these inquiries should allow similar inquiry in extradition
cases. The judiciary has the experience and resources to make such in-
quiries in extradition cases.
E. United Kingdom Extradition Treaty
The Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom'
57
expands the judiciary's role by legislatively negating the rule of non-in-
quiry with regard to extradition to and from the United Kingdom.1
5 8
This provision was adopted in response to the questionable practices of
the "Diplock" court system set up to preside over cases involving the
Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland.' 9 Because the rule of non-
inquiry has been partially abandoned, it would not be difficult to allow
the court to extend this abandonment to all relators.
Under Article 3(a) of the Supplementary Treaty, Congress has ex-
plicitly given the United States judiciary the responsibility for determin-
ing the motive underlying the United Kingdom's extradition request and
the fairness of its judicial system.16° The court has the power to deny
extradition if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the United
Kingdom's motives are improper, or that its judicial system is unfair.'
6
Article 3(a) gives the relator the right to introduce evidence and to prove
in court that the judicial system is unfair.
The Supplementary Treaty focuses on whether the relator qualifies
for the political offense exception to extradition. Prior to the Supplemen-
154. See generally Banoff & Pyle, supra note 128, at 182.
155. See INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION, supra note 52, at 381.
136. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: A Summary of the Contemporary
American Practice and a Proposed Formula, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 733, 746 (1969).
157. SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM S. Exc.,
Rep. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1986) [hereinafter Supp. TRiEATY].
158. Scharf, supra note 93, at 258.
159. Id. at 264.




tary Treaty, the scope of inquiry in determining whether extradition to
the United Kingdom fell under the political offense exception was limited
to an examination of whether the crime was incidental to, or in further-
ance of, a political uprising or disturbance.'
62
F. International Examples of Refusal to Extradite
The decision by the European Court of Human Rights in the Case of
Soering represents an important international precedent on the refusal to
extradite because of anticipated torture, cruel conditions of incarcera-
tion, or lack of due process at trial in the requesting country.1
63
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms provides: "No one shall be subjected to torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."' 64 The European
Court of Human Rights recently applied this provision in the Case of
Soering, to prevent the extradition of Jens Soering from the United King-
dom to the United States. 6 Soering was charged with stabbing his girl-
friend's parents to death in Virginia. Soering, who potentially faced the
death penalty in the United States, claimed that to subject him to the
"death row phenomenon" would constitute a violation of the European
Convention. 166 While in England, he filed a complaint with the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights, which ultimately referred the case
to the European Court of Human Rights. 67
After considering criteria for assessing "torture, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment," the European Court of Human Rights
unanimously held that extraditing Soering to the United States under
those conditions would violate the European Convention.' 68 The court
set forth factors to be considered in assessing what amounts to a viola-
tion. These factors include "all the circumstances of the case, such as the
nature and context of the treatment or punishment, the manner and
method of its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in
162. Scharf, supra note 93, at 258.
163. Case of Soering, 195 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), reprinted in 28 I.LM. 1063 (1989).
164. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms § I, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
165. 195 Eur. CL H.R. (Ser. A), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. at 1069.
166. Id, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. at 1088.
167. The European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights were both established in Article 19 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953). The Commission receives complaints of human rights violations and may
direct the case to the Court of Human Rights if the legal issues require the Court's attention.
The Commission and the Court convene in Strasbourg, France.
168. Soering, 195 Eur. CL H.R. (Ser. A), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. at 1105.
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some instances, the sex, age, and state of health of the victim.' 69 The
European Court adopted the principle that an extraditing country is re-
sponsible for measuring the conditions in the requesting country to en-
sure that the relator will not be subjected to torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment.
The U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment is another instrument which
protects potential torture victims from extradition. 7 ' In addition to pro-
tecting from extradition those who would be in danger of being tortured,
the Convention directs the extradition or prosecution of suspected tortur-
ers.17' It defines torture as "any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person ...
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in
an official capacity."' 72 Although the United States signed the Conven-
tion on April 18, 1988, the Senate has yet to ratify the Convention.
Moreover, the State Department has attached various proposed reserva-
tions, understandings, and declarations.' Therefore, the Convention is
not yet binding upon the United States.
United States courts may also be able to rely on the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights,' 74 the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,175 and the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights to deny extradition requests. 176 These instruments explicitly pro-
169. Id, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. at 1096.
170. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or other Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984)
(entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention]. The Convention obligates parties
to "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of tor-
ture" within their jurisdictions. Id. art. 2, T 1. However, the countries most responsible for
torture are the least likely to adopt the Convention.
171. Id
172. Id. art. 1, 11.
173. Moor & Nichols, supra note 4, at 29.
174. Art. 5: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment." G.A. Res. 217 A, at 71 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
175. Art. 7: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medi-
cal or scientific experimentation." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200 A, U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A (1966).
176. Art. 5(2): "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for
the inherent dignity of the human person." OAS Official Records Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 655,
Rev. 1, Corr. 1, Jan. 7, 1970.
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hibit the use of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment.
These international examples demonstrate that the United States
needs to do more to protect relators from potential mistreatment. Euro-
pean courts and the United Nations have adopted measures that can pro-
tect individuals from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in
requesting countries. By establishing a limited exception to the rule of
non-inquiry, United States courts could also recognize the humanitarian
concerns of relators.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to protect a relator from inhuman treatment following ex-
tradition, the United States judiciary should have the option of con-
ducting an inquiry when the relator presents evidence of treatment which
is antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency. This standard would
allow the courts to recognize humanitarian concerns at the extradition
certification hearing. This standard would not overrule Neely v. Henkel
because it would not require that the requesting state follow procedures
identical to those of the United States courts. The standard would guard
against torture and cruel and inhumane treatment.
The judiciary is in a better position than the executive branch to
protect the relator from torture or inhumane treatment or punishment.
The federal courts have established procedures for hearing evidence and
could process allegations more efficiently and fairly than the executive
branch. The inquiry could be incorporated into the extradition certifica-
tion hearing and would have the added benefit of shielding the executive
branch from any embarrassing political repercussions. The judiciary is
empowered by the Constitution to make this type of inquiry.1" The
courts presently decide the very same issues in different instances and are
authorized by Congress to make this inquiry under the Supplementary
Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom. International courts and
the United Nations have recognized that countries have an obligation to
protect people from torture or inhumane treatment and punishment.
So that the United States will be able to protect the relator, federal
courts must be allowed to inquire into the potential treatment of the rela-
tor in the requesting country. We must abandon the rule of non-inquiry
in international extradition.
177. In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1487 (7th Cir.1984).
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